Recently, Spotify has reclassified its premium individual, duo and family subscription services as “bundled subscription services” in an ill-informed attempt to deprive songwriters and music publishers of their rightfully earned U.S. mechanical royalties. As a result, the agreed-upon revenue share rate for Spotify premium, currently 15.2%, may effectively be reduced to less than 12%, depending upon a number of factors. Losses to songwriters and publishers, estimated by Billboard to be $150 million on an annualized basis, will undoubtedly increase over time as subscription revenue and users grow.
Let me say straight away that this column is not intended to embarrass or disparage Spotify in any way. Quite the opposite: This is a respectful appeal to the company, specifically its senior leadership team, to do the right thing by songwriters, regardless of what strategies they appear to believe are legally permissible.
Spotify has an unfortunate and documented history of punching down at songwriters and music publishers. In just the last few years, this includes appealing the Phonorecords III decision, which reasonably raised the mechanical royalty rate from 10.5% to 15.1% of revenue over a five-year period (while also providing discounted terms for family and student accounts that are beneficial to Spotify and other music services). Almost immediately after serving notice of its intention to appeal Phonorecords III, Spotify moved to retroactively implement the Copyright Royalty Board’s final pre-appeal decision and clawed back a multi-million-dollar credit from songwriters and music publishers throughout 2019. The appeal and remand process lasted for many years, ultimately delaying the payment of a large amount of mechanical royalties, including those earned during the hardship of the COVID-19 pandemic, until February 2024. And finally, in late 2021, Spotify proposed statutory rates for 2023-2027 that the NMPA referred to as the “lowest royalty rates in history.”
While the settlement of Phonorecords IV in 2022 was celebrated by both streaming services and music publishers, Spotify and other DSPs had especially good reason to rejoice. The settlement provides that revenue share rates minimally increase from the prior rate of 15.1% to 15.35% over a five-year period while also providing for discounts related to not only family and student accounts but also Spotify duo —subscription tiers that are meaningful to Spotify given the strong growth of family and duo plans, as the company has noted in earnings reports. The settlement also provides specific terms for DSPs that choose to bundle a qualifying music subscription service with other products and services.
It’s difficult to imagine why Spotify could have any degree of buyer’s remorse concerning the Phonorecords IV settlement or deliberately attempt to manipulate its terms given how clearly reasonable and fair it is. Spotify presumably entered into the settlement with the full knowledge and acceptance that it was agreeing to pay the revenue share rates of 15.1% to 15.35% upon a properly undiluted revenue base, as it had been doing until March 2024.
But Spotify has again devalued the contributions of songwriters to its platform, a move that has been described by rights and advocacy organizations as “cynical,” “potentially unlawful,” “greedy” and “offensive.”
I’ve been asked a lot in recent weeks why Spotify is doing this. The answer, other than perhaps “because they believe they can,” is simple. I believe that Spotify is unjustly attempting to reduce the amounts it pays to songwriters and music publishers in order to (1) effectively use the displaced royalties to offset the costs of running its audiobook business and (2) improve its margins.
Spotify’s reframing of the vast majority of its subscription services as bundled subscription services is a work of fiction. It has done so, in part, by launching a standalone audiobooks access tier that does not appear commercially attractive to users and was launched, at least to an extent, to support its “bundling” strategy. As noted in the Mechanical Licensing Collective’s (the MLC) legal complaint against Spotify, the audiobooks access tier is largely hidden from view on Spotify’s website on a page where the primary purpose is to steer subscribers to premium, not audiobooks access.
The audiobooks access tier is also only available in the United States, the only country to which the Phonorecords IV settlement and accompanying statutory framework applies, and is notably not available in any other country where audiobooks are available in premium. Spotify’s intent is rather obvious on its face, but to think that the availability of the audiobooks access tier as implemented is something of a silver bullet that qualifies it to reclassify its premium individual, family, and duo tiers as a bundled subscription service is a true mark of acting in bad faith. To do so when Spotify is reportedly on the cusp of rightfully raising prices in the United States is all the more insulting.
In the wake of the ire directed at Spotify from songwriters and the music publishing community in recent weeks, the company has issued statements to Billboard and other media.
First, Spotify has stated that it is simply doing what other services have done with bundled products. In my opinion, this is misleading. The Spotify competitors that have availed themselves of bundle reporting methods have done so for products that are bona fide bundles consisting of individually available services and products that hold a clear commercial value, and to which users actively elect to subscribe. Spotify has even done this itself for bundled products on a more limited basis, in the manner actually intended by the Phonorecords IV settlement and its predecessors. But as the MLC’s legal filing against Spotify notes, anyone who subscribed to Spotify premium prior to November 8, 2023, did not elect to receive audiobooks content or functionality. Many premium users have not utilized audiobooks even once; and, as of this writing, a non-student Spotify subscription without audiobooks does not even exist.
Spotify has also been quick to point out that music publishers “agreed to and celebrated” the Phonorecords IV settlement. I can assure readers there is no world in which the music publishing community truly believed that it was agreeing to bundling provisions in the manner in which they are being abused by Spotify to drastically reduce its payments to songwriters and music publishers. At minimum, Spotify’s actions clearly violate the spirit of the agreement, and to say otherwise is blatantly dishonest. To the extent Spotify may believe it has outsmarted songwriters and music publishers, there should be no pride in ownership.
Finally, Spotify has stated that it “paid a record amount to publishers and societies in 2023 and is on track to pay out an even larger amount in 2024,” which presumably refers to Spotify’s global rather than U.S. domestic spend on music publishing royalties. This may be true given Spotify’s growth trajectory, which as of its most recent reporting was up 20% year-over-year in revenue and up 14% in premium subscribers. However, it is wholly irrelevant and a deflection from the issue. Simply paying more from one year to the next does not atone for the grave offense at hand. The amount of royalties paid is not the only pertinent metric.
Spotify has repeatedly stated its desire to become a more efficient and profitable company. I applaud that. Spotify operating profitably is good for the music business — including songwriters and music publishers. And Spotify is welcome to spread its wings and invest in new areas of business such as podcasts and audiobooks. But let’s be clear: The royalties that Spotify pays to songwriters and music publishers (and other music rightsholders including record labels) are not preventing it from becoming or remaining profitable.
Spotify has said on multiple occasions, including during its 2022 investor day presentation, that it has chosen to prioritize growth over profitability and has done so deliberately and willingly. Its music gross margin has operated at strong numbers and improved over time, in part thanks to its marketplace initiatives, but overall gross margin has been dragged down by investments the company has made in the podcast space. Not all of those investments, including content deals and acquisitions of other companies, have produced positive results, as is well documented in various media, and Spotify has since pivoted to operate more efficiently and better ensure that its costs do not grow quicker than its revenue.
The royalties Spotify pays to songwriters and music publishers are not the problem, nor are the royalties it pays to others. Spotify receives tremendous value in exchange for the mechanical and other royalties that it pays for musical works, and songwriters should not be treated by Spotify as a drag on its margins. To pay slightly north of 15% of revenue for songwriters’ creative output is a gift, and there is absolutely no reason for Spotify to sneak around corners to dilute songwriters’ income. It is beyond the pale, even relative to actions that Spotify has taken against songwriters and publishers in recent years.
I love Spotify and have been a user since the very beginning. But I value the songs upon which it has built its entire business even more. Spotify is a house built by songwriters. In the modern listening environment, which heavily depends upon personalization, recommendations and playlists, songs and songwriters are an even more crucial part of the infrastructure and the value conveyed to consumers who pay Spotify subscription fees.
I’ve often said that compensating songwriters in accordance with the value that they bring to music streaming platforms is not only good business but also good for business. Spotify’s relationship with songwriters and publishers, whether it realizes it or not, is mission-critical and not just about maintaining positive sentiment. Given the global stature of Spotify and the company’s interest in various content types including podcasts, music videos and lyrics, returning its relationship with songwriters and publishers to a respectful position is important to its future. Unfortunately, Spotify’s relationship with the songwriter and music publishing communities that it has built its business upon is now more fraught and damaged than ever. Trust has been almost entirely eroded. That cannot merely be chalked up to, as Spotify stated during its most recent earnings call, “natural tensions between suppliers and distributors.” But it may not be too late to fix things.
Here is my genuine and respectful appeal to Spotify, and it’s not a big ask: Please voluntarily honor the Phonorecords IV settlement on the intended terms that you know fully well were agreed to and promptly reverse course on your misguided attempts to reduce U.S. mechanical royalties in this manner. Songwriters and the broader music publishing community will thank you. If this is too much to ask, I believe the songwriting community will never want to hear another word from Spotify about, to use the company’s own words, “giving a million creative artists the opportunity to live off their art.”
Adam Parness was the global head of music publishing at Spotify from 2017 to 2019. He currently operates Adam Parness Music Consulting and serves as a highly trusted and sought after strategic advisor to numerous music rightsholders, notably in the music publishing space, as well as popular global brands, technology-based creative services companies and firms investing in music and technology.
